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
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

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THE ARISTOTELIAN PREDICABLES AND MAIMONIDES' DIVISION OF ATTRIBUTES

BY

HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

NEW YORK

1938

Off-print from Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller

THE ARISTOTELIAN PREDICABLES AND MAIMONIDES' DIVISION OF ATTRIBUTES

By HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

THE problem of attributes was not invented by Maimonides. Back of it at the time of Maimonides was a history of over four centuries of speculation on the attributes of God in Arabic philosophy, and back of these speculations in Arabic philosophy were, according to Maimonides himself,[1] similar speculations in the writings of the Christian Church Fathers, and back of these, it may be added, was the problem of attributes in the works of Philo. Maimonides draws upon these sources, and directly so upon Arabic sources, for his own discussion of the problem. There is hardly a phase of the problem dealt with by Maimonides which has not its parallel in the works of his predecessors. But this old problem receives at his hands a fresh treatment, more thorough, more comprehensive and more systematic than in any of his sources. Particularly new is his treatment of attributes as a problem of logical judgment. To his predecessors the problem was primarily metaphysical; he stresses the logical aspect of it. To his predecessors the problem was solved once one has arrived at the conclusion that the

[1] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 71.

terms predicated of God are not to be taken literally, that they are His essence, or that they are according to His essence, or however else the denial of the existence of attributes in God was expressed. To Maimonides, however, this did not mark the end of the problem. For, arriving at the conclusion that terms predicated of God are His essence, he asks himself: What is the logical meaning and significance of these terms when predicated of God? And so throughout his discussion, even when operating with terms and ideas borrowed from others, he gives to these terms and ideas a new turn, a new twist, and makes them fit into the framework of the problem as he has formulated it.

The present paper, however, will confine itself to the single topic of Maimonides' familiar division of attributes into five classes and will endeavor to show how by drawing upon older sources, and especially upon Aristotle's various classifications of predicables, Maimonides arrived at a new type of classification.

The statement with which Maimonides opens his general discussion of the problem of attributes in Ch. 50 (of *Moreh Nebukim* I) may be also considered as the logical starting point of his classification of attributes which comes subsequently in Chs. 51–52. For, in this statement, as we shall see, he lays down the principle, which is essential to his entire treatment of the problem, that terms predicated of God must conform to all the rules which govern the use of predi-

cables in logical judgments. He says: "Belief does not refer to something uttered with the lips but rather to something conceived by the soul when that conception of the soul is attended by the belief that it is in reality as it is conceived."[2] The sentiment expressed in this statement is an old one, and parallels to it have been cited[3] and more parallels can still be cited. But in the new phrasing and setting given to it by Maimonides it assumes a new meaning. This passage, as will be noticed, contains two statements. First, a contrast between that which is only "uttered with the lips" and that which is not a mere utterance of the lips but a conception of the soul. Second, the association of belief with a conception of the soul which corresponds to external reality. Now, the contrast between a mere verbal utterance and that which is not a mere verbal utterance reminds one of Aristotle's contrast between a verbal sentence (λόγος) and a logical proposition (λόγος ἀποφαντικός).[4] It is thus quite evident that by a conception of the soul which is not a mere verbal utterance Maimonides means that which Aristotle calls a logical proposition. Not so evident, however, at first sight, is the Aristotelian origin of Maimonides' statement that belief is to be associated with a conception of the soul which corresponds to reality. But when we recall that a logical proposition is defined by Aristotle

[2] *Ibid.* I, 50.
[3] Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, p. 369, n. 9.
[4] *De Interpretatione*, Ch. 1, 16a, 2, and Ch. 4, 17a, 2–3.

as a combination of terms in which there is "either truth or falsity"[5] and that truth is to be tested by the correspondence of the ideas in our mind to the objects outside our mind[6] and that such truth can be established mainly by syllogism[7] but partly also by induction[8] and, finally, that every belief is founded upon the evidence of either syllogism or induction,[9] we can easily see how on the basis of these statements of Aristotle one could arrive at a definition of belief such as given here by Maimonides. What Maimonides therefore means to say is that belief is that which can be expressed by a logical proposition. Since this is what is meant by belief, then every statement made about God which is to express any of our beliefs about His nature must of necessity constitute a logical proposition the truth of which is to be tested by its correspondence to the reality of the nature of God. Irresponsible terms, such as religious people are in the habit of applying to God in their prayer, however laudatory they may sound, do not constitute a true expression of religious belief, and, according to Maimonides, their use is to be discouraged.[10] "A prayer," says Aristotle, "is a verbal sentence" and not a logical proposition, inasmuch as it is "neither true nor false."[11]

[5] *Ibid.*, Ch. 4, 17a, 2–3.
[6] *Metaphysics* IV, 7, 1011b, 27.
[7] *Analytica Posteriora* I, 2, 71b, 17–18.
[8] *Ibid.* II, 5, 91b, 34–35.
[9] *Analytica Priora* II, 23, 68b, 13.
[10] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 59.
[11] *De Interpretatione*, Ch. 4, 17a, 4–5.

Similarly Maimonides would say that exaltations and glorifications of God are not proper expressions of true religious belief, inasmuch as they do not constitute logical propositions.

Having laid down in Ch. 50 the principle that predications about God must constitute logical propositions, Maimonides proceeds to give in Ch. 51 a general classification of such propositions. There are two kinds of logical propositions, he says, one in which the predicate signifies something superadded to the essence of the subject and the other in which the predicate signifies that which is the essence of the subject. In the first type of logical propositions, he says in effect, the predicate is to be called accident, irrespective of the fact whether it has only a transient existence in the subject of which it is predicated or whether it is co-eternal with that subject.[12] In the second kind of logical propositions, he continues, the predicate may be a term having the same meaning as that of the subject, as, e. g., in the proposition "man is man" or it may be the "explanation of a term" (*perush shem*), as, e. g., in the proposition "man is a rational animal." Propositions like 'man is man,' however, are not regarded by him as logical propositions and are dismissed by him as mere tautologies. Propositions like

[12] Based upon the following statement in *Moreh Nebukim* I, 51: ולא בשלילת שם המקרה ישולל ענינו, כי כל ענין מוסף על העצם הוא משנ אותו בלחי משלים אמתתו, וזהו ענין המקרה, מחובר אל מה שיתחייב מהיות דברים רבים קדומים. That accidents may be eternal is stated by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V, 30, 1025a, 30–34. This kind of accidents is what Aristotle otherwise calls 'property' (cf. Ross's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, *ad loc.*).

'man is a rational animal,' on the other hand, are taken by him as exemplifications of logical propositions of the type in which the predicates signify the essence of the subject.

The expression "explanation of a term" seemingly reflects Aristotle's expression "a phrase of what a term signifies" (λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα),[13] which is rendered in Averroes' Middle Commentary on *Posterior Analytics* by "a phrase explaining a term,"[14] as contrasted with the expression "a phrase of what a thing is" (λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι),[15] which is rendered in Averroes' work as referring to a phrase "which shows the essence of a being."[16] In Aristotle the former expression is used as a description of what is generally called a nominal definition, whereas the latter expression is used as a description of what by way of contrast is called a real definition, or, as Aristotle describes it in that particular passage in *Posterior Analytics* II, 10, a definition which indicates the cause of the definitum.[17] Similarly Avicenna, in a passage which is evidently based upon the passages in the *Posterior Analytics* just

[13] *Analytica Posteriora* II, 10, 93b, 30.

[14] *Averrois Expositio Media in Librum Demonstrationis Aristotelis*, Tractatus II (*Aristotelis . . . opera*, Venice 1574, Volume I, Part III, p. 29 E): "Oratio declarans nomen." Hebrew: המאמר המפרש לשם (Averroes Middle Commentary on the *Organon*, MS. Jewish Theological Seminary, fol. 216a).

[15] *Analytica Posteriora* II, 10, 93b, 29.

[16] "Quod doceat substanitiam entis." (*loc. cit.*). Hebrew: מודיע לעצם הנמצא (*loc. cit.*).

[17] *Analytica Posteriora* II, 10, 93b, 39. Averroes calls this kind of definition "definitio in veritate" (*loc. cit.*). Hebrew: הגדר באמת (*loc. cit.*).

referred to, makes use of the expression "explaining the meaning of a term"[18] with reference to a nominal definition. Taken in this sense, the expression "explanation of a term" used here by Maimonides with reference to the definition "man is a rational animal" would seem to imply that Maimonides considered a definition of this type to be only a nominal definition. But this can hardly be the case, for several reasons. In the first place, both Aristotle and Avicenna, whose logical views Maimonides is following here, consider a definition of the type of 'man is a rational animal' as an example of a real definition. In the second place, from the context of the passage in which Maimonides uses the expression 'explanation of a term' it is quite evident that unlike its corresponding Aristotelian and Avicennian expression it is used by him with reference to a real definition, for while indeed he speaks of the phrase "rational animal" as being only the "explanation of a term", he also speaks of it as expressing "the true essence of man"[19] which reflects the expression "a phrase of what a thing is" quoted above from Aristotle as a description of a real definition. Moreover, the expression 'explanation of a term' applied by Maimonides to the predicate 'rational animal' is explained by himself subsequently to mean that "the thing referred to by the term 'man' is that thing which is

[18] *Najat* I: Logic, ed. Rome 1593, p. 20, 11.51 sqq.; ed. Cairo 1913, pp. 130–131.

[19] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 51: כי החי המדבר הוא עצם האדם ואמתתו.

composed of animality and rationality."[20] This explanation certainly cannot refer to a nominal definition. Finally, later when Maimonides takes up the question whether a definition is predicable of God or not, he rejects it on the ground that the elements of a definition constitute the causes of the definitum.[21] This corresponds exactly to the description of a real definition used by Aristotle and his followers,[22] and Maimonides would not have made use of this description unless he considered a definition of the type 'man is a rational animal' to be a real definition. There can be no doubt, therefore, that, unlike Aristotle and Avicenna, Maimonides uses the expression 'explanation of a term' with reference to a real definition . What justification he had in making use of that old expression in a new sense will now be explained.

The locus classicus of Aristotle's discussion of the predicables is in Topics I, 4–9. There Aristotle begins with a general division of predicables into those which signify the essence of the subject and those which do not signify the essence of the subject, calling the former definition and the latter, rather loosely, as he says, property.[23] This, as will be noticed, corresponds exactly to Maimonides' general classification of attributes into those which signify the essence of the subject and those

[20] *Ibid.*: שהדבר אשר שמו אדם הוא הדבר המורכב מן החיים והדבור.

[21] *Ibid.*, I, 52: וזה המין מן התאר מרוחק מן האל יתברך אצל כל אדם שהוא יתעלה אין לו סבות קודמות שהם סבת מציאותו.

[22] Cf. above n. 17.

[23] *Topics* I, 4, 101b, 19–23.

which signify something superadded to the subject. Then, taking up those predicates which signify the essence of the subject, i. e., real definitions, he distinguishes between what is to be properly called 'definition' (*ὅρος*) and what is to be called only 'definitory' (*ὁρικόν*). A definition, he says, is always 'a certain phrase' (*λόγος τίς*), that is to say, "a phrase signifying a thing's essence" (*λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων*),[24] though the subject of the definition, that is, the definitum, may be either a term or a phrase, for a definition, says Aristotle, may be "either a phrase in lieu of a term or a phrase in lieu of another phrase".[25] In Averroes' Middle Commentary on the *Topics* this Aristotelian expression "a phrase in lieu of a term" is rendered by the statement "it explains that which a simple term signifies" and is illustrated by the proposition "man is a rational, mortal animal."[26] In contradistinction to a definition, which is always "a certain phrase", a "definitory", says Aristotle, is that which explains one term by some other synonymous term, as, for example, the explanation of the term 'seemly' (*πρέπον*) by 'beautiful' (*καλόν*).

From the foregoing analysis of passages we may

[24] *Ibid.*, 101a, 39.

[25] *Ibid.*, I, 5, 102a, 1.

[26] *Averrois Expositio Media in octo libros Topicorum*, Liber I, Cap. 4: "Explicat quid simplex nomen significet, prout dicimus, an homo sit animal rationale [mortale]" (op. cit., p. 8 G). Hebrew: מודיע למה שיורה עליו שם נפרד כאמרנו האדם חי מדבר מת (op. cit., fol. 231b). The occasional addition of the term 'mortal' in the definition of man is referred to by Maimonides himself in *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 10.

gather that the expression 'explanation of a term' was used in Arabic versions of Aristotle's logic in two distinct senses. First, it was used, as in the passages quoted from Avicenna and from Averroes' Middle Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, in the sense of a nominal definition in contrast to a real definition, being thus the equivalent of Aristotle's expression λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ("a phrase of what a term signifies") in *Posterior Analytics* II, 10, 93b, 30, as contrasted with the expression λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι ("a phrase of what a thing is"). Second, it was used, as in the passage quoted from Averroes' Middle Commentary on the *Topics*, in the sense of a real definition (ὅρος) in contrast to that which is only "definitory" (ὁρικόν), being thus the equivalent of Aristotle's expression λόγος ἀντ' ὀνόματος ("a phrase in lieu of a term") in *Topics* I, 5, 102a, 1, as contrasted with the explanation of one term by another synonymous term. Or, to put it more simply: according to the first sense of the expression "explanation of a term", the word 'term' (Arabic: *ism*, Hebrew: *shem*, ὄνομα) is used as the opposite of the word 'essence' (Arabic: *ḏāt* or *māhiyyah*, Hebrew: *'eẓem* (*'aẓmut*) or *mahut*, τὸ τί ἐστι; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). According to the second sense of the same expression, the word 'term' is used as the opposite of 'explanation' (Arabic: *sharḥ*, Hebrew: *perush*) in which case 'explanation' is the equivalent of the word 'phrase' (Arabic: *ḳaul*, Hebrew: *ma'amar*, λόγος). Now the passage of Maimonides under consideration, as will have been noticed, corresponds to the passage of Aristotle in the *Topics*. In both of them the contrast is between a predicate which signifies the essence of the subject by a single term, such as "the seemly is beautiful" in Aristotle and "man is man" in Maimonides, and a predicate which signifies the essence of the subject by a phrase, such as "man is a rational animal", in both Aristotle and Maimonides—in the former according to the paraphrase of Averroes. Consequently, Maimonides' use of the expression 'explanation of a term' with reference to 'rational animal' reflects Aristotle's expression "a phrase in lieu of a term" in *Topics* I, S, 102a, 1, the word 'explanation' (*sharḥ*, *perush*) thus having here the meaning of the word 'phrase' (λόγος, *ḳaul*, *ma'mar*), and does not therefore imply that he considered 'rational animal' as only a nominal definition of 'man'.

In the light of what has been said, the passage in Chapter 51 in which Maimonides uses the expression 'explanation of a term' is to be rendered as follows: "If that attribute signified the essence of the subject, then [either it would be a single term synonymous with that of the subject, in which case] it would be a mere tautology, as if, for example, one would say 'man is man', [26a] or it would be a phrase explaining a term, as

[26a] Though in Maimonides' illustration (אלאנסאן הו אלאנסאן, האדם הוא האדם) the term used for the predicate is the same as that used for the subject, his statement that the proposition is tautological would be true even if the predicate were a term synonymous with the subject. Cf. Moses ha-Lavi, *Ma'mar Elohi*, MS. Bodleian 1324.5, fol. 120b: ואמנם כשהיה נשואה ונושאה דבר

if, for example, one would say 'man is a rational animal', [in which case the attribute would be neither a tautology nor an additional element to the essence of the subject], for the phrase 'rational animal' signifies the true essence of man, emphasizing as it does, [first], that no third element besides 'rational' and 'animal' enters into the essence of man, and, [second], that it is man alone that can be described by the terms animality and rationality. This attribute is thus only a phrase explaining a term without the implication of any element superadded to the essence designated by that term, being only an assertion, as it were, that the thing which is referred to by the term 'man' is that thing which is composed of animality and rationality." Similarly in Chapter 52, when he says with reference to a definition of the type 'man is a rational animal' that it is "the explanation of a term and nothing else,"[27] he does not mean that it is the explanation of a term only and not the explanation of the essence, but rather that it is the explanation of a term denoting the essence and not the explanation of something added to the essence.

Corroborative evidence that the expression "explanation of a term" is used here by Maimonides with reference to a real definition may be found in another passage of Avicenna which would seem to be the under-

אחד בעינו, הנה אין שם נושא ונשוא באמת, אבל יהיה טובן המאמר אשר בזה לא יניע מפנו תועלת, בין שהולץ באותו הענין בשם אחד, כאמרנו שהאדם אדם, או בשני שמות נרדפים, כאמרנו שהחמור עיר, כי זה [המאמר שוה] לאמרנו שהחמור חמור.

[27] פירוש שם לא דבר אחר.

lying source of Maimonides' passage here under consideration. In that passage Avicenna tries to show how the simplicity of God is to be understood to exclude three kinds of divisibility. It reads: "We also say that the essence of the Necessary Being cannot have (1) principles out of the aggregate of which that Necessary Being would be constituted, nor (2) parts of quantity, nor (3) parts of a definition (*ḥadd* = ὅρος) or a phrase (*ḳaul* = λόγος). [As for principles], it makes no difference whether they are principles like matter and form or principles of some other kind. But [in the case of parts], if they are parts of a *phrase explaining the meaning of the term* 'God', then each one of the parts must signify something which in existence is essentially different from any other part. The reason why God cannot have parts of a definition is this. If anything is described by parts of the kind mentioned, then the essence of any part of it will not be the same as the essence of any other part nor will it be the same as the essence of the whole, so that even though it is possible for each of its parts to have a separate existence for itself, the whole could not possibly have an existence without those parts and could not therefore be said to have necessary existence".[28]

[28] *Najat* III: *Metaphysics*, ed. Rome, p. 63, 11.1 sqq.; ed. Cairo, p. 371; Latin: *Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium*, by K. Carame, Rome 1926, pp. 72–73. The bracketed additions in my translation are necessary for the purpose of making the meaning of the text intelligible and are based upon Avicenna's own subsequent analysis of this passage on p. 63, ll. 10–12 (ed. Rome), p. 372, ll. 3–6 (ed. Cairo), p. 74, ll. 1–7 (Latin).

From the context of the passage it is quite clear that the definition or phrase referred to is a real definition. Still Avicenna speaks of it as the explanation of the meaning of a term — the very same words used by him in the passage quoted previously with reference to a nominal definition.

The general twofold classification of attributes given by Maimonides in Chapter 51 is increased by him to a fivefold classification in Chapter 52. These five classes of attributes are given by him the names of 'definition', 'part of definition', 'quality', 'relation' and 'action'. To this may be added a sixth one, namely, 'negation', which Maimonides discusses later but omits from his formal classification, for the reason that in this chapter, as explicitly stated in the opening sentence, he confines himself to positive attributes. No literary precedent, as far as I know, is to be found for this fivefold classification of attributes. The nearest analogy to it is the fivefold classification of attributes by Algazali[29] and the fourfold classification by Abraham ibn Daud[30] which is evidently based upon that of Algazali. Thus corresponding to Maimonides' 'definition' and 'part of definition' are Algazali's and Abraham ibn Daud's first class of attributes which they call 'essential attributes', under which Algazali mentions 'genus' and 'difference' and Abraham ibn

[29] *Maḳaṣid al-Falasifah* II: *Metaphysics* III, ed. Cairo (without date), p. 150; Latin: *Algazel's Metaphysics*, ed. J. T. Muckle, pp. 62–63.

[30] *Emunah Ramah* II, iii, p. 54.

Daud mentions 'genus'. Similarly corresponding to Maimonides' 'quality' are their 'accidental attributes', which in Algazali are subdivided into two classes,[31] and corresponding to Maimonides' 'relation' is the attribute of relation in both of them. Finally, corresponding to Maimonides' 'negation', which, as we have observed, is placed by him outside his formal classification, is the last class in both Algazali's and Abraham ibn Daud's lists, where it is likewise called 'negation'. But while Maimonides' classification has undoubtedly been influenced by that of Algazali and Abraham ibn Daud, still it contains certain differences of both arrangement and terminology which would seem to indicate that there were some other sources and some other considerations which had led Maimonides to adopt his own particular classification. What these sources and considerations were will now be explained.

In those chapters in the *Topics*, which we have shown to be the underlying sources of Maimonides' preliminary twofold classification of attributes in Chapter 51, Aristotle, after having made his general twofold division of predicables into those which signify the essence of the subject and those which do not signify its essence, subdivides them further into two classes each. Those which signify the essence of the subject are subdivided by him into definition and genus. Those which do not signify the essence of the subject are subdivided by

[31] Cf. my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 686, n. 4.

him into property and accident.[32] Property and accident, though both of them are considered by Aristotle as predicates which do not signify the essence of the subject, differ from each other according to him in that the former "is present (ὑπάρχει) to a certain thing alone"[33] whereas the latter is "something which may be present or may not be present with any one and the self-same thing".[34] Elsewhere, however, he designates both accident and property as accident.[35]

But, then, after arriving at his fourfold classification of 'predicables' (κατηγορήματα), Aristotle seems to have reminded himself of his tenfold classification of the 'predicaments' (κατηγορίαι), or categories, as they are usually called, and makes the suggestion that the four predicables may be combined with the ten categories, for, as he says, "the accident and genus and property and definition will always be in one of these categories".[36] The obvious implication of this statement is that the categories, which are a classification of being, can also be treated as predicables, which are a classification of logical relations, so that instead of speaking of four predicables one could speak of ten predicables or of any other number into which Aristotle occasionally divides his categories.

In the history of Aristotelian philosophy, however,

[32] *Topics* I, 4, 101b, 17–25.
[33] *Ibid.* I, 5, 102a, 18–19.
[34] *Ibid.*, 102b, 6–7.
[35] Cf. above, n. 12.
[36] *Topics* I, 9, 103b, 23–25.

this suggested combination was not taken up. Categories and predicables, as a rule, were kept apart,[37] and while philosophers did not exactly speak of four predicables as they spoke of ten categories they did speak of five predicables, the five being Porphyry's modification or Aristotle's list, in which the latter's 'definition', 'genus', 'property' and 'accident' became 'genus', 'species', 'difference', 'property' and 'accident'.[38]

On the basis of these facts, then, Maimonides had before him three possible enumerations of predicables or, as he calls them, attributes. (1) He could have followed Aristotle's formal statement in the *Topics* and enumerated four attributes. (2) He could have followed Porphyry and enumerated five attributes. (3) He could have followed Aristotle's later suggestion in the *Topics* and enumerated ten attributes, corresponding to the ten categories. Now, in his formal treatise on logical terms, Maimonides follows Porphyry's enumeration, which by his time had already become standardized in philosophic literature, and he concludes his reproduction of Porphyry's five predicables with the following characteristic statement: "These are the five universal notions as they have been enumerated by the ancients."[39] Here,[40] however,

[37] An indirect suggestion as to the use of the ten categories as predicables may be found in Saadia's *Emunot we-De'ot* II, 8–12. A similar suggestion as to the use of the ten categories as predicables is to be found also in St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* V, 8 (VII).
[38] *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Busse, pp. 1 sqq.
[39] *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Cf. 10.
[40] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52.

in his discussion of divine attributes, he combines all the three possible types of classifications we have mentioned. From Porphyry he borrows the number 'five' and in conformity with it he divides his attributes into five classes, as was done also by Algazali, evidently for the same reason. But having paid tribute to custom and retained the Porphyrian term five, he returns to the original fourfold classification of Aristotle and he follows it faithfully in the first and second parts of his enumeration. His first class of attributes is called by him definition, exactly as it is in Aristotle, and his second class of attributes, illustrated by the terms 'animality' and 'rationality', that is to say, genus and difference, is called by him 'part of definition', which is only another way of expressing what Aristotle calls 'genus', for the term 'genus' is used by Aristotle to include also 'difference', for, as he says, "difference, being attached to genus, is to be ranked alongside with genus".[41] Furthermore, in the passage quoted above from Avicenna, the terms 'genus' and 'difference' are referred to as 'parts of definition'.[42] Then evidently acting upon Aristotle's suggestion in the *Topics* as to the possibility of combining the predicables with the categories, he substitutes for the general terms 'property' and 'accident' a complete enumeration of the nine accidental categories, for 'property', as we have seen, is to Aristotle only a special kind of 'accident'.

[41] Topics I, 4, 101b, 18–19.
[42] Cf. above p. 213 and n. 28.

But inasmuch as Aristotle himself sometimes has a threefold classification of categories in which the nine non-substantial categories are grouped together under the headings of *τὰ πάθη*, modifications, i. e., qualities, and *τὰ πρός τι*, relations,[43] and furthermore inasmuch as for his own particular problem of divine attributes the categories which may be grouped together under the heading of relation presented a different problem than those under the heading of quality, Maimonides mentions only the categories of 'quality' and 'relation'. Under these two categories, however, we shall try to show, Maimonides explicitly mentions, or indirectly refers to, all the nine categories.

'Quality' is divided by Maimonides, after Aristotle,[44] into four main classes and is used by him as a general term under which he includes also the categories of possession, action, passion and quantity. Thus in the first class of quality, which Aristotle as well as Maimonides calls 'habit' and 'disposition',[45] the term 'habit' (*ἕξις*, Arabic: *milkah*, Hebrew: *ḳinyan*) suggests the category of *habere* (*ἔχειν*,[46] Arabic: *al-milk*, Hebrew: *ha-ḳinyan*), i. e., 'possession'. Furthermore, Maimonides in his restatement of this kind of 'quality' includes under 'habit' not only what Aristotle calls habits of 'knowledge' (*ἐπιστῆμαι* Arabic: *'ilm*, Hebrew: *ḥakmah*)

[43] *Metaphysics* XIV, 2, 1089b, 23–24. The term *πάθη* in this passage is generally understood to be used by Aristotle in the sense of *ποιά*.
[44] *Categories*, Ch. 8.
[45] *Ibid.*, Ch. 8, 8b, 27.
[46] Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. 15, 15b, 18.

and of 'virtue' (ἀρεταί, Arabic: ḫulḳ, Hebrew: *middah*)[47] but also what he himself calls habits of 'art' (Arabic: ṣinā'ah, Hebrew: *melakah*, τέχνη) which he illustrates by the term 'carpenter', and thus the term habit suggests also the category of 'action'. In the second kind of 'quality', which is described by both Aristotle and Maimonides as including all those terms which refer to "natural power or lack of power", the expression "natural power or lack of power" is explained by Aristotle, though left unexplained here by Maimonides, as a natural power or lack of power "of doing something easily",[48] the term 'doing' (ποιῆσαι) thus reflecting the category of 'action' (ποιεῖν). The category of 'passion' (πάσχειν) is reflected in the third class of quality which is described by both Aristotle and Maimonides as that of "passive (παθητικαί) qualities and passions (πάθη)".[49] Finally, the fourth kind of quality is that of "figure and shape", which Maimonides, after Alfarabi, explicitly describes as "quality resulting from quantity as such",[50] thus reflecting the category of quantity. And so under quality Maimonides really includes, besides the category of quality, also the categories of possession, action, passion and quantity.

Similarly 'relation' is used by Maimonides as a general term under which he includes three categories or, as he says, three kinds of relations: (1) the relation

[47] *Ibid.*, Ch. 8, 8b, 29.
[48] *Ibid.*, 9a, 18–19.
[49] *Ibid.*, 9a, 28–29.
[50] Cf. Munk, *Guide* I, p. 196, n. 5.

of a thing to place, (2) the relation of a thing to time, and (3) the relation of one thing to another thing. The last of these three kinds of relation corresponds to Aristotle's general definition of relation as that which explains one thing with reference to another thing, Maimonides' expressions לזולתו and לאיש אחר thus reflecting Aristotle's expression πρὸς ἕτερον.[51] Though Aristotle himself does not put the categories of place and time under relation, Maimonides' combination of these three categories is not without precedent, for we find that Plotinus argues for the inclusion of time and place under relation.[52] Avicenna, too, takes relation to include the categories of time and place, though he goes even further and includes under it all the other categories,[53] as does also Maimonides' contemporary Averroes.[54] The term relation, furthermore, may also have been used by Maimonides to include the category of position, though no specific mention is made of it by him here, for we know that Aristotle's category of relation sometimes includes also the category of position.[55]

These three kinds of relation are illustrated by Maimonides by four examples, namely, (1) A is the

[51] *Categories*, Ch. 7, 6a, 37.
[52] *Enneades* VI, i, 14.
[53] *Shifā'*, fol. 27a, 18–22, quoted in I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe*, p. 93, n. 8.
[54] *Epitome in Metaphysicorum libros*, Lib. I (*Aristotelis opera* . . . Venetiis apud Iutnas, 1574, Vol. V, p. 359 B-C); Arabic: ed. Quiros, § 29, p. 17; German: M. Horten, *Die Metaphysik des Averroes*, p. 16, S. van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes*, p. 12.
[55] *Categories*, Ch. 9, 11b, 8–10; cf. Ch. 7, 6b, 3.

father of B, (2) A is the partner of B, (3) A is the resident of a certain place, (4) A is he who lived at a certain time. Of these four examples the third and fourth are quite obviously meant to illustrate respectively the relations of place and time, whereas the first and second are presumably meant to illustrate what Maimonides calls the relation of one thing to another. Thus while only one example each is given for the relations of place and time, two examples are given for the relation of one thing to another. Furthermore, later, in the course of his discussion, Maimonides subdivides the relation of one thing to another into what he vaguely calls (a) correlation and (b) some relation.[56] What he exactly means by these two subdivisions he does not explain. But from his arguments against their applicability to God it may be gathered that by 'correlation' he means the mutual relation between two things which are dependent upon each other as cause and effect and that by 'some relation' he means the numerical relation between two things which share something in common but in different proportions, for against the admissibility of the former as a divine attribute he argues that God as cause is independent of His effects, and against the admissibility of the latter he argues that there can be no relation of more and less or equality between God and other beings.[57] The question naturally arises in

[56] (a) הצטרפות, (b) קצת יחס.
[57] Cf. Shem-tob on *Moreh Nebukim, ad loc.*

our mind whether the two examples Maimonides mentions as illustrations of the relation of one thing to another correspond to his two subsequent subdivisions of that kind of relation. I shall show, by a study of the history and meaning of these two subdivisions, that this is exactly the purpose which the two examples were intended for by Maimonides.

In his *Metaphysics*[58] Aristotle divides relation into three kinds, two of which, necessary for our purpose here, are mentioned by him also in his *Physics*.[59]

The first kind of relation is called by Aristotle the relation of "the active to the passive"[60] or the relation of "agent and patient"[61] and he illustrates it by the example of a father who "is called father of his son" because "the one has acted, and the other has been acted on in a certain way".[62] The second kind of relation is called by Aristotle "numerical relation"[63] or the relation of "that which exceeds to that which is exceeded"[64] or the relation between "excess and defect"[65] and he illustrates it by the examples of "double", "triple", and "greater".[66] Under this kind of relation he includes also the relation of "sameness", "likeness" and "equality".[67] The main characteristic

[58] *Metaphysics* V, 15, 1020b, 26 sqq.
[59] *Physics* III, 1, 200b, 28–30.
[60] 1020b, 30.
[61] 200b, 30.
[62] 1021a, 23–25.
[63] 1020b, 32–33.
[64] 1020b, 28.
[65] 200b, 29.
[66] 1020b, 26–23; cf. *Categories*, Ch. 7, 6a, 39, 6b, 18–19, 31.
[67] 1021b, 8–10.

of this numerical relation is that the things so related must have something in common with reference to which they can be compared, for, as Aristotle says, "those things are the same whose substance is one; those are like whose quality is one; those are equal whose quantity is one".[68]

In the light of these statements of Aristotle it is quite clear that Maimonides' distinction between 'correlation' and 'some relation' corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between relation of 'agent and patient' and 'numerical relation' and also that, as in Aristotle, his example of father-son relation was meant by him to serve as an illustration of agent-patient relation or of what he himself subsequently calls 'correlation'. In view of this it is not unreasonable to assume that his example of partnership was likewise meant by him to serve as an illustration of numerical relation or what he himself subsequently calls 'some relation'. The aptness of the example of partnership as an illustration of numerical relation will be more readily understood when it is recalled that by numerical relation Aristotle means a relation existing between two things which share the same substance or quality or quantity in either unequal or equal proportions.[69] In using the example of 'A is partner of B' Maimonides means therefore to say that 'numerical relation' is a sort of 'partnership' between two things which share the same

[68] 1021b, 10–12.
[69] Cf. above nn. 66, 67.

substance or quantity or quality in either unequal or equal proportions. Still more clear does the aptness of this illustration become when taken in connection with his subsequent refutation of the existence of a numerical relation between God and creatures, on the ground that all terms applied to God must be understood in an equivocal sense, even as "the term 'existence' is applied to Him and to other beings, according to our opinion, only in an equivocal sense".[70] When we recall that in Arabic the term for 'equivocalness' (*ishtirāk*) is based upon a word meaning 'to be a partner' (*sharik*), we may see the pointedness of this contention of Maimonides in arguing that there can be no 'numerical relation', i. e., partnership, between terms predicated of God and terms predicated of other beings on account of the fact that they are predicated of them "in an equivocal sense". In its original literal meaning Maimonides' argument is this: There is no 'partnership' between God and other beings except in so far as they share in the same sound of certain words which are applied to them in absolutely unrelated meanings.

The first four kinds of Maimonides' classification thus have their origin in Aristotle, based as they are upon a combination of his fourfold classification of predicables and his tenfold and threefold classification of categories. In view of this, it is quite natural for

[70] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52 (4) ואיך יצוייר יחס בין מי שאין בינו ובין מה שזולתו עניין שיכללם בשום פנים, כי המציאה אמנם תאמר אצלנו עליו יתעלה ועל זולתו בשתוף נמור.

us to inquire whether his fifth attribute, which he calls action, has a similar origin, or whether it is something of his own device, dictated by the exigency of the problem of divine attributes, in which action had to be separated from all the other attributes, inasmuch as it is the only attribute which according to him can be predicated of God affirmatively. This question seems to have occurred to Joseph Caspi, for he makes the following comment: "I do not remember to have come across this [fifth] class of attributes in any of the books on logic or physics, that is to say, that it should be treated as a special class of attributes, and I am inclined to think that it is a distinction made by Maimonides out of his own head".[71] He furthermore states that Maimonides' attribute of action is "a subdivision of relation",[72] which he subsequently qualifies by saying that it is "the lowest of the subdivisions of relation".[73]

By the last statement Caspi undoubtedly means to say that Maimonides' action is to be identified with that kind of relation which, as we have seen, Aristotle describes as the relation of "agent and patient" or "the active to the passive". In this Caspi is quite obviously wrong, for it can be shown that in that part

[71] *Maskiyyot Kesef, ad loc.* in *'Ammude Kesef u-Maskiyyot Kesef*, ed. Werbluner, p. 58: והחלק החמישי מתארי החיוב וג', זאת החלוקה לא אזכור שהיא בספרי ההגיון והטבע, רצוני שיעשה מזה חלוקה מיוחדת, אבל מדעתי הוא דיוק מהפורה.

[72] *Ibid.*: והכוונה בזה שזה מפיני המצטרף.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 59: read) אם כן מבואר שזה החלק החמישי הוא הסעיף השפל שבסעיף שבסעיפי) ההצטרפות.

of his discussion of relation, in which Maimonides tries to show that relations such as that of father to son cannot be predicated of God, his discussion is a direct criticism of all his predecessors, Jewish, Moslem and Christian, ever since Philo, who invariably admitted such a kind of relation, i. e., the relation of agent and patient, as an attribute of God, which kind of relation, according to a comment by Narboni on Algazali, is also to be called action.[74] Furthermore, it can also be shown that even such philosophers as Baḥya ibn Paḳuda,[75] Joseph ibn Ẓaddiḳ[76] and Judah ha-Levi,[77] who explicitly speak of an attribute of action, mean by action the relation of agent and patient which is rejected here by Maimonides. What Maimonides really means by action that is not a relation is not the subject of the present paper. For the present we shall confine ourselves to the problem raised by Caspi in the first part of his statement and shall try to show that in Aristotle's discussion of predicables there is to be found a passage which will account for Maimonides' treatment of action as an attribute to be distinguished from the other four attributes.

[74] Narboni on *Kawwanot ha-Pilosofim* II: Metaphysics III, MS. Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, Cod. Heb. 901, fol. 73b: Algazali: הרביעי הטוב והוא ישוב אל צרוף העצמות אל פועל סודר ממנו. Narboni: הרביעי תארי הפעולות והוא צרוף העצמות אל פועל סודר ממנו.

[75] *Hobot ha-Lebabot* I, 9.

[76] *'Olam Ḳaṭan* III, ed. Horovitz, p. 48.

[77] *Cuzari* II, 2. Judah ha-Levi's relative attributes (אצאפיה', טפליות), which he distinguishes from actional attributes (האתיריה', מעשיות), are of a different nature and have a different origin, as I hope to show elsewhere.

In Aristotle, besides the fourfold and tenfold classifications of predicables which he discusses in *Topics*, I, 4–9, there is also another type of classification to which he makes reference in *De Interpretatione*, Chs. 5 and 10. Sometimes the predicate of a proposition, he seems to say, is connected with its subject by the copula 'is' (*τὸ ἔστι*), which is described by him as being "additionally predicated as a third element" (*τρίτον προσκατηγορῆται*),[78] and sometimes the predicate and the copula are combined into one word which he refers to as "a verb" (*ῥῆμα*).[79] This distinction, which in Aristotle is only slightly suggested, has been fully developed by Ammonius who also invented the terms by which it has been known to subsequent logicians. Propositions in which the copula is distinct from the predicate are described by him as propositions of the third adjacent (*προτάσεις ἐκ τρίτου κατηγορουμένου, propositiones tertii adjacentis*),[80] whereas propositions in which the copula is merged with the predicate are described by him as propositions of the second adjacent (*ἐκ δύο . . . ἀποτελοῦνται, propositiones secundi adjacentis*).[81]

This distinction between a predicate which Aristotle describes as a 'verb' and a predicate which in the language of Aristotle is connected with the subject by the copula 'is' "additionally predicated as a third element" is also made use of by Maimonides in his treatise on logical terms.[82] Furthermore, like Ammonius he describes a proposition in which the predicate is only a 'verb' as a "two-termed proposition",[83] and it is called a two-termed proposition even when other terms are contained in it as direct objects of the verb. The illustrations used by him for two-termed propositions are "A stood", "A killed B".[84] Similarly a proposition in which the predicate is a noun or an adjective or a participle connected with its subject by some form of the copula 'to be', which in Arabic as well as in Hebrew is either expressed or only understood, is described by him as a "three-termed proposition".[85] The illustrations used by him for this kind of proposition are: "A is standing", "A was standing", "A will be standing".[86] Now in Greek and Latin and all other European languages, in which there is a present tense as well as a past and future tense, propositions of the second adjacent can be expressed by a verb in the present tense as well as by one in the past or future tense. But in Arabic and in Hebrew there is no present tense. The present tense is always expressed by a participle

[78] *De Interpretatione*, Ch. 10, 19b, 19–20.
[79] *Ibid.*, Ch. 5, 17a, 10.
[80] *Ammonius in Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius*, ed. Busse, p. 14, 1.23; cf. also p. 8, 11.5–6. Cf. Wm. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 228, 230.
[81] Ammonius, *op. cit.*, p. 7, 11.30–31.

[82] *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Ch. 3, and cf. ed. Leon Roth, p. 13, n. 3, and ed. M. Ventura, p. 36, n. 5.
[83] *Ibid.*: משפט שני.
[84] *Ibid.*: ראובן הרג את שמעון; ראובן עמד.
[85] *Ibid.*: משפט שלישי.
[86] *Ibid.*: ראובן הוא עתה עומד או היה עומד או ימצא עומד.

which has an adjectival meaning as well as the meaning of a *nomen agentis*. It is impossible, therefore, to have in these languages a proposition of the second adjacent expressed in the present tense. The sentence "God creates" could be rendered into Arabic and Hebrew only by a sentence which would literally mean "God is a creator" or "God is creating". The only way of forming a proposition of the second adjacent in Arabic and Hebrew is to use the perfect or imperfect tense of the verb 'to create'.

This is exactly the meaning of Maimonides' attribute of action as distinguished from the other four attributes. The four attributes of definition, part of definition, quality and relation are all used as predicates in propositions of the third adjacent; they are all to be connected with the subject by a copula which is either to be expressed or to be understood. The attribute of action, on the other hand, is always to be used in a proposition of the second adjacent, in which the predicate and copula are combined in what Aristotle as well as Maimonides calls a 'verb'.[87] And when we scrutinize the passage in which Maimonides himself draws a distinction between action in the sense of quality and action in the sense in which he uses it we shall find that it is mainly based upon the distinction between propositions of the third adjacent and propositions of the second adjacent. Action as a quality, he says in effect, is always expressed in a proposition of

[87] Cf. below n. 89.

the third adjacent, as, e. g., "A is a carpenter", "A is a smith". Action in the sense in which he uses it, on the other hand, is always to be expressed in a proposition of the second adjacent, as, e. g., "A made this door", "A built this house", "A wove this garment",[88] and if in Scripture it happens to be expressed in a proposition of the third adjacent it must be interpreted to stand for a proposition of the second adjacent. The reason for this is quite understandable. In a proposition of the third adjacent the predicate will always be a participle which, having the meaning of an adjective or *nomen agentis*, may imply the existence of a habit or disposition or natural power in the subject to which the action is attributed. In a proposition of the second adjacent, however, where the predicate is a verb, the action attributed to the subject is to be taken as pure action without any implication of habit or disposition or natural power. Accordingly, this fifth kind of attribute may be referred to as 'verb' as well as 'action', and the Arabic term *fi'l* (Hebrew: *pe'ulah*) which Maimonides uses here in connection with his fifth kind of attribute may have the meaning of the term *fi'l* (Hebrew: *po'el*) in his *Millot ha-Higgayon* where it is used in the sense of 'verb' as distinguished from participle, which he calls 'noun' (Arabic: *ism*; Hebrew: *shem*),[89] thus reflecting the Greek term ῥῆμα which is

[88] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52 (5).

[89] *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Chs. 1 and 13, and cf. n. 1 on p. 87 in ed. Leon Roth. It is to be noted that the Greek ῥῆμα in *De Interpretatione*, Ch. 10, 19b, 22 is rendered in Isḥāḳ ibn Ḥonian's Arabic translation of that book

used by Aristotle in his description of propositions of the second adjacent.

In the light of the foregoing discussion of the various parts of Maimonides' fivefold classification of attributes, we may arrive at the conclusion that his classification is the result of a combination of four types of classification. First, Aristotle's classification of predicables into those which he calls 'verbs' and those which are connected with their subject by the copula 'is'. Second, Aristotle's classification of predicables according to his various classifications of the categories. Third, Aristotle's formal fourfold classification of predicables. Fourth, Porphyry's augmentation of Aristotle's four predicables to five. It is also possible for us to retrace the steps by which Maimonides arrived at his classification. He must have started with the general division of attributes into 'verbs', which combine in themselves the copula, and nouns or adjectives or phrases, which require a distinct copula to connect them with the subject. Under the former he placed all the terms which belong to the category of action — action considered as a distinct category and not as included under the categories of quality and relation.[90]

(*Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles*, ed. Isidor Pollak, 1913) by the term *kalimah* (Hebrew: *dibbur*)—the very same term which in *Millot ha-Higgayon*, Chs. 3 and 13, Maimonides uses in the same sense as the term *fi'l* (Hebrew: *po'el*).

[90] Aristotle himself, according to Simplicius, uses action as a distinct category in a sense different from action as a relation. Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 132. It is to be understood, of course, that in its application to God action is not taken by Maimonides as an accident. Cf. Efodi on *Moreh Nebukim* I, 52 (5).

Under the latter he placed all the attributes belonging to the other eight categories, including among them also action used in the sense of relation. Then taking the attributes of this latter type, he divided them according to the most general division of the categories to which they belong, namely, substance and accident. But following Aristotle's division of the category of substance into the predicables of 'definition' and 'genus', the latter used in the sense of both 'genus' and 'difference', he designated the predicates belonging to the category of substance as the attributes of 'definition' and 'part of definition', the expression 'part of definition' having been borrowed by him from Avicenna. Then, again, following Aristotle's occasional classification of the accidental categories into 'quality' and 'relation', he placed all the accidental categories, minus the distinct category of 'action', under the categories of 'quality' and 'relation' and designated them as the attributes of 'quality' and 'relation', substituting them for the two predicables which Aristotle calls 'property' and 'accident'. Finally, taking the resulting new classification of predicables or attributes, he coordinated them and referred to them as the five attributes, corresponding to the conventional reference to the five predicables of Porphyrian origin.

This classification of attributes by Maimonides, quite apart from its specific theological application, may be considered, in its bearing upon the general problem of the nature of logical judgment, as a new and independent revision of Aristotle's list of predicables—one on a par with the revision introduced by Porphyry, and perhaps even of greater importance than the Porphyrian revision. Consequently, histories of philosophy or of logic, which hitherto have assumed that nothing new had happened in the classification of predicables from the time of Porphyry to that of Kant, may now report that a new list of predicables was introduced in the 12th century by Maimonides, and by the side of Porphyry's five predicables of 'genus', 'species', 'difference', 'property' and 'accident' they may now place Maimonides' five predicables of 'definition', 'part of definition', 'quality', 'relation' and 'verb'.

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